Sibel Edmonds testified under oath August 8, 2009. This segment covers her testimony regarding the involvement of US and Turkish officials in a nuclear trafficking network, and the outing of Brewster Jennings as a CIA front company which was investigating them.
SOURCE: See Video 2 of 5, Transcript pgs 54-64
TRANSCRIPT, Pgs. 54-64:
Q Okay. Ms. Edmonds, have you ever reviewed your Wikipedia entry?
A Once in a while I do. I don’t know when was the last time, but maybe a year ago.
Q Okay. I mean, do you know have you contributed to it or do you know people who do contribute to it?
A No. I know many people, they give me mainstream media articles or any reports. They put it in there, but, no, I haven’t contributed.
Q When you’ve looked at it, have you thought that it’s generally accurate about most of the statements?
A Yes, generally, yes.
Q One of the things that it indicates in your biographical information is that you’ve made certain allegations. Some of them we’ve talked about a little bit, and I wanted to ask you about some of the others. One of the entries indicates nuclear secrets black market, and it says, “Edmonds alleges that in the course of her work for the government she found evidence that the FBI, State Department and Pentagon had been infiltrated by a Turkish and Israeli run intelligence network that paid high ranking American officials to steal nuclear weapons secrets,” and they have some footnotes for that, some cites.
Is that correct that you’ve made those allegations?
A That information is correct, and if ever — you can get, I would say, those government organizations and others. There’s another place missing there. They list the State Department itself, but there is one other place that’s missing.
Q And what is that place?
A That would be RAND Corporation.
Q And can you tell me about the — give me some more information about the Turkish and Israeli run intelligence network that is referred to there?
A This information has been public, documenting methods of intelligence gathering. Yes. Through certain U.S. officials, executively appointed officials, foreign entities, not necessarily or not only government related; so if you say Israel and Turkey, not only government but other entities because it has multi-layers.
Q All right.
A Their operations, and some of these layers sometimes they conduct their operations independently and with the sole purpose of obtaining a profit, and therefore, the information they obtain, let’s say, the nuclear or weapons technology, weapons technology related information doesn’t necessarily only go to Turkey or Israel, but they sell it to the highest bidder. That’s how they operate. They contact their people whether it’s in ISI, in Washington, D.C. part of the military attache for Pakistani intelligence, or the certain Saudi business people in Detroit may be contacted, and they say, okay, and talk about these Turkish entities. This is we have obtained this particular DVD containing this, and this person is willing to pay 500,000. Will you offer more because if you don’t, we will give it to this person. So what I’m trying to say is they do it both for governments, foreign governments, but some of those operatives, they also — they offer it in open market, and they have — they have individuals on their payroll on almost every major nuclear facility in the United States. RAND Corporation and various — in Midwest, various Air Force labs that develop certain weapons technology, which I am not very familiar with the technology itself.
Q When you refer to the or when the article refers to the paid, high ranking American officials, can you identify who they are?
A That person has been identified by others.
A And he has been identified as Mr. Marc Grossman, who used to work for the State Department.
Q Right, and Mr. Grossman, I think, was also in your gallery, correct?
Q And I read somewhere that Mr. Grossman had some relationships with a Turkish organization, Turkish diplomats here in the United States.
A Yes. He had very, very close relationship with not only Turkish diplomatic communities and entities, but business and also some of these criminal layer operatives that I told you about. Currently, that he’s nor working; he actually is working for a Turkish company called Ihals Holding.
Q Okay. Now, was Mr. Grossman the ambassador to Turkey at some point?
Q Okay, and then what was his position at the State Department, if you recall?
A He had several different positions. I believe in 1999 or 2000, was European Affairs. That dealt a lot with NATO, and afterwards during early bush administration’s stage, he was the second or the third highest person in the State Department. I’m not sure about the title.
Q Okay, and during that time — I’m sorry — during that time when he was the second or third highest ranking person in State, I’ve read somewhere that you’ve alleged that he actually warned the Turkish Embassy about a CIA front company that had been set up to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons.
A That would be summer 2001. Whatever title he held at that point, he, Mr. Grossman, informed a certain Turkish diplomatic entity who was also an independent operative of a company called Brewster Jennings because Brewster Jennings was frequenting the American Turkish Council as a consulting or analyst firm, and there were certain nuclear related operatives who wanted to hire Brewster Jennings and have it pose as a front company. So there were talks between those Turkish operatives and Brewster Jennings, and Mr. Grossman wanted those people to be warned that Brewster Jennings was a government front, front for government, and it was a front. It was not a company for the front for government, U.S. government, and for those Turkish individuals to be told to stay away from Brewster Jennings. But the person who received that information, the Turkish diplomatic but also operative, actually contacted the Pakistani military attache and discussed with the person who was there about this fact and also told them, warned them to stay away from Brewster Jennings.
Q And now was this one of the allegations or one of the concerns that you brought to the attention of anybody at any point?
A You mean when I was working for the FBI —
A — and I blew the whistle inside the FBI?
A No, I didn’t do it inside the FBI because at that point I didn’t know they were covering up this information. Only after I was fired and the State Secrets Privilege was invoked, and knowing what I knew, I went to Congress and discussed it with certain people in Congress. I brought it up with the Inspector General’s Office inside during a meeting, and at that point will provide them the details in terms of dates and who were those targets, which I can’t provide right now, the direct targets.
Q And when you say “the Inspector General’s Office,” do you mean a DOJ Inspector General?
A Correct. I’m sorry. Glenn Fine’s, under Glenn Fine’s office.
Q And why would Mr. Grossman, if you know, warn the Turkish government and other people not to deal with this CIA front?
A There were various relationships and various activities Mr. Grossman was engaged with these individuals, and I don’t know which reasons was the top reason for him to do it. Some of them were the monetary relationship, but others dated back to operations that he was leading while he was an ambassador in — U.S. ambassador in Ankara, in Turkey, until 1997, and some of these operatives dealt with him, and they were doing certain operations in Central Asia for him. I don’t know who he was working for, Mr. Grossman, at the time for his operations. It’s hard for me to tell. He was involved in so many different things, and I don’t know which one constitutes the biggest reason he was providing this.